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This study examines price stabilization in new equity issues. Stabilization truncates the distribution 
of post-issue prices at a floor price, lowering the risk of adverse price moves and hence, in 
a competitive dealer market, reducing the bid-ask spread. Using 1,523 NASDAQ-traded fitm- 
commitment initial public offerings issued between 1982 and 1987, we find that spreads narrow when 
the market price is close to the offer price and stabilization is most likely. Moreover, significant 
negative returns are documented after the hypothesized termination of stabilizing activities, sugges- 
ting that stabilization, and its cessation, affect market prices. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on initial public offerings (IPOs) focuses primarily on the 
pricing and trading behavior of new issues. This literature geperaih; assum~c 
that the eventual market determination of the intrikisic raiuc 91 .m IPO results 
from the unobstructed interaction of supply and demand. VL* .iie this ssumptioz 
is tenable for underpriced issues (those experiencing positive ini+. - o returns), the 
price discovery process for overpriced issues can often be impeded by price 
stabilization. 
Although stabilization refers to numerous practices, the definition we use, 
from a 1940 Securities and Exchange Commission release, is ‘the buying of 
a security for the limited purpose of preventing or retarding a decline in its open 
market price in order to facilitate its distribution to the public’ [Securities 
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Exchange Act Release 2446 (194011. To absorb open market selling and prevent 
a drop in market prices, the underwriter of an offer enters a ‘syndicate bid’, 
usually at the issue price. If selling pressure is large enough to preclude buying 
the securities at the issue price, the underwriter may either decrease its bid to 
successively lower levels or cease its efforts at stabilization altogether. Given 
that such activities are capital-intensive and their duration is governed by 
regulation [discussed in section 21, the underwriter can engage in stabilization 
for only a short period of time. 
In this paper, we examine a sample of 1,523 NASDAQ-traded firm-commit- 
ment initial public offerings of stock issued between 1982 and 1987. Although 
actual stabilizing purchases are not observable, we provide indirect evidence of 
the existence of market stabilization through the behavior of bid-ask spreads 
and prices. We find that bid-ask spreads are smaller for issues hypothesized to 
be most affected by stabilization. Furthermore, stabilized offers decline in value 
following the cessation of stabilization. 
Our findings complement work on the mark.et microstructure of public equity 
offerings. Although information err the timing or amount of stabilizing pur- 
chases has never been reported to the SEC, managing underwriters were 
required to inform the SEC if they engaged in stabilizing activities. Stoll(1976) 
and Hess and Frost (1982) use this information to examine the influence of 
stabilization on returns. Stoll (i976) finds that, for a sample $50 new equity 
issues, stabilized issues underperform nonstabilized issues by 4.3’ 6 ovel the first 
ten days of trading. However, this difference is insignificant. He concludes that 
b 
. . . stabilization appears to occur in response to falling prices and presumably 
in an attempt to shore them up. The evident lack of success of stabilization 
makes one wonder why it is engaged in’ (p. :Ol). 
Hess and Frost (1982) divide a sample of 152 seasoned utility equity issues 
into stabilized and nonstabilized offers. They find that stabilization has no price 
effect for fourteen days after the offer. 
Miller and Reilly (1987) examine the return and spread behavior of IPOs over 
the first five days of trading. For their sample, they find that the relation of the 
spread and its determinants differs between overpriced and underpriced issues 
only on the first trading day. Their study, however, does not incorporate the 
influence of stabilization on market prices. Hegde and Miller (1989) examine 540 
IPOs, and while their model ‘does not explicitly account for underwriter stabi- 
lization’, they find the direct effect of stabilization on spreads to be ‘negligible’ 
(p. 85). In contrast, Ruud (1992) finds that the distribution of 1PO returns is 
consistent with the existence of stabilizing activities. She documents a similarity 
between the statistical characteristics of simulated price-supported returns and 
actual returns data. 
The remain&r of t6ke r;Lper I; organized as follows. In section 2, we provide 
background information on the regulation of stabilization. The testable implica- 
tions of the effect of stabilization on bid-ask spreads and return behavior are 
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presented in section 3. Section 4 describes the data and methods employed. In 
Q sF.ction 6. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. The regulation and economics of stabilization 
2.1. Regulaction of s tabilization 
Section 9(a)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it unlawful to: 
effect either alone or with one or more other persons any series of 
transactions for the purchase and/or sale of any security registered on 
a national exchange for the purpose of pegging, fixing, or stabilizing the 
price of such security in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors.’ 
: 
The SEC, ‘:\.::i ,;~f;i. ?; .k * 
4) .,,ognizes that stabilization ‘is now an integral part of the 
-.- :$, .y ;le;l’lc a$ ;j .%m oi fixed price security distribution’ and that ‘in the field of 
:*$&Grg it is faced with an existing condition, not a theory’.2 In 1955, the 
~~_~~mission adopted Rule lob-7, which sets forth the guidelines regulating the 
stabilization activities of participants in an offering at the time of distribution. 
This rule requires that the intent of the underwriter and the syndicate to stabilize 
the issue be disclosed in the prospect* . When there is no existing market for the 
security, as is the case with initial public offerings, the only limitation on the 
initial stabilizing bid is that it cannot exceed either the offer price or the bid of 
the highest independent dealer. Once a stabilizing bid is entered, it may be 
maintained or reduced at any time, but may only be raised if the stabilizer has 
made no purchases for three successive business days. There is no time limit 
per se to stabilization, but the SEC has ruled as follows: 
Rule lob-7 contemplates stabilizing transactions with relatively brief 
time limits; therefore, the pegging and fixing of a price over an extended 
period in connection with a, continuing offering violates the anti-manipu- 
lative provisions of the Exchange Act.3 
‘Securities Exchange Act of 2934 s 9(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. $ 781(a)(6) (1982). 
‘Stock Exchange Bzactices, Report of the Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate Report 
No. 1455. 73d Coigress, 2d Sessiz (!934) 55. 
“First Home investment Corp. of Kansas, SEC 1971 ‘70-‘71 CCH Dec. c78,091. 
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2.2. Economics of stabilization 
Stabilization attempts to smooth, mitigate, or even avoid short-run price 
declines. The underwriter of the offering may also believe that stabilization in 
the first few trading days can avert or mitigate price declines indefinitely, 
particularly if there is heavy selling during the first few days of trading and the 
distribution is not complete. Moreover, if a price drop is apportioned over 
a number of days, the perception of overpricing ma.y be obscured by intervening 
market moves or informational shocks, thus concealing the overpricing from the 
undeswriter s clients (both investors and issuers). 
The SEC acknowledges that stabilization is a form of price manipulation. 
However, it is ‘a negake type of manipulation since it seeks to retard and not to 
Wea:*; afirrwtioe market movements’.4 The SEC argues that the success of 
firm-commitment underwritings depends on the ability of the underwriter to sell 
the securities at or near the offer price. 1 VW example, if the market price falls 
substantially below the offer pvice before the distribution is complete, investors 
will purchase shares in the open market; the underwriter would then be unable 
to sell the remaining shares t the offer price. In the absence of stabilization, 
underwriters may be less willing to offer firm-commitment contracts which, in 
turn, may hinder the ability of firms to raise capital. 
The SEC recognizes that investors might be harmed because stabilization 
artificially pegs the price of the securities and facilitates the distribution of 
overpriced securities to the public. However, the SEC argues that underwriters 
that engage in stabilization for the purposes of manipulation would suffer a 
loss in reputation and would thus be less able to underwrite securities in the 
future. 
3. Testable implications of the effect of stabilization 
Since information on stabilizing activities is no longer available, we examine 
the effect of stabilization using indirect measures. Like Ruud (1992X we argue 
that stabilization truncates the distribution of post-offering stock returns in the 
short run. In this study, we investigate the presence of stabilization by examining 
the effect of this distributional truncation on the bid-ask spread. 
Numerous studies, including Copeland and Galai (1983), demonstrate that 
the width of the bid-ask spread for a stock is at least partially determined by the 
volatility of the underlying stock price process. One explanation for this relation 
is the ‘inventory cost’ explanation. Dealers who post firm bid-ask quotes buy at 
the bid and sell at the ask. Subsequent price moves expose dealers to two types 
of losses. First, if the price subsequently increases, dealers suffer opportunity 
losses by selling at an ask which turns out to be too low. Second, and of greater 
4Securities Exchange Act Release 2446 (1940); italics from text. 
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relevance to this study, if the price subsequently decreases, the dealers’ inventory 
of shares declines in value, thus imposing losses. 
Stabilizing activities ser 7~f: to reduce this second cost. If dealers believe that, at 
least in the short run, stabilizing activities will prevent the market price from 
falling below some floor price, then inventory losses due to price declines will be 
mitigated. For example, assume that a dealer posts a bid price of SlO, b&wing 
that there is a floor price of $9 at which the stabilizer is willing to buy stock from 
all potential sellers (including the dealer). In this case, the maximum loss the 
dealer believes he will incur on shares purchased at his quoted bid is $1. 
Assuming that the dealer market is competitive, this reduction in potential 
losses will be reflected in the cost of providing liquidity services, i.e., the bid-ask 
spread. The value of this truncation to the (iealer, and thus the reduction in the 
width of the bid-ask spread, depends on a number of factors. One important 
component is the diRerence between the posted quote and the floor price, which 
represents the maximum inventory loss suffered by the dealer due to price 
declines. As this difference narrows, inventory losses are reduced, as are the costs 
of providing liquidity services. Therefore, holding other factors known to affect 
the width of the bid-ask spread constant, there should exist a positive relation 
between the width of the quoted bid-ask spread and the distance between the 
current posted quotes and the floor price. 
Stabilization is also analogous to a ‘protective put’ in that it truncates 
losses at the floor price. Indeed, as outlined in the appendix, stabilization 
at a floor price can be viewed as a put option written by the stabilizer with 
a strike price equal to the floor price. As the value of this option increases, 
the dealer’s potential losses decline. Again, with competition among dealers, 
this decline will be reflected in the bid-ask spread. Thus, all else equal, 
there should exist a negative relation between the width of the quoted 
bid-ask spread and the value of a put option with a strike price equal to the 
floor price. 
Stabilization, by nature, is capital-intensive. Moreover, as was discussed in 
section 2, stabilizing activities must, by law, be terminated once the distribution 
is complete. Stabilization, therefore, should last for only a short time. I-Jcace, the 
positive ielation between the width of the quoted bid-ask spread and the 
distance between the current posted quotes and the floor price, as well a& the 
negative relation between the width of the quoted bid-ask spread and the value 
of the put option written by the stabilizer, should decay over time. 
Finally, stabilization is effectively a form of legal price manipulation. There- 
fore, ending such activities allows the unobstructed forces of supply and demand 
to dictate fair market prices. Since stabilization only exists to retard price 
declines, those issues that have been stabilized should experience observable 
declines in market price once stabilization is discontinued. Note, however, that 
in order to observe post+t&ilization price declines, the value of the stabilizer’s 
bid must exceed the intrinsic value of the security when stabilization ends. In 
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other words, stabilizers do not smooth price declines all the way to the ‘true’ 
market value. 
4. Data and methods 
4.1. Data 
The initial sample contains all 2,758 firm-commitment initial public offers 
issued from January 1982 to September 1987, identified from the hoestment 
Dealers’ Digest Corporate Database, which is also the source for the offer date, 
CUSIP identifier, and offer price. In order to ensure access to bid, ask, and 
volume data, we require that the firm be initAly listed and traded on NASDAQ. 
In addition, the firm must have nonzero velurx on the day of the issue to ensure 
that offer and trading dates coincide. The final data set contains 1,523 IPOs. 
Since we are interested in the effect of stabilization on the cost of dealers’ 
services, we record the reported closing bid-ask spread from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data ftir each security in the sample for each 
of the first thirty trading days. For the 453 (1.0% of the total) observations for 
which bid or ask data is not available, the spread is not computed and that day’s 
observation is omitted. We measure the relative bid-ask spread as the closing 
bid-ask spread divided by the daily price of the security reported on CRSP. 
To measure the marginal effect of price stabilization on quoted spreads, we 
control for other factors known to affect the bid-ask spread. FlalloGr:g Hegde 
and Miller (1989) and others, we model the relative spread as a function of 
trading volume, price, the number of market makers, and vi;-latility. Conse- 
quently, we collect data from CRSP on daily share volume, the number of 
market makers, and the corresponding market price, measured as the bid-ask 
midpoint of the security. From this data, we construct a number of volatility 
estimates which are detailed below. If any of these variables are missing from 
CRSP, the firm is not included in the sample for that day. 
4.2. Methods 
We model the efl’ect of stabilization on bid-ask spreads using a method that 
allows for variation over time in this variable. Since we hypothesize that the 
duration and intensity of stabilization activities will decay over time, we com- 
pute separate cross-sectional regressions for each day for days l-30, using the 
relative bid-ask spread as the dependent xriable and factors known to affect 
the bid-ask spread as independent variables. This method is similar to that used 
by Ibbotson (1975), Miller and Reilly (1987), Hegde and Miller (1989), and 
Conrad and Niden (1991). Due to missing values, the number of observations 
usled in ti,ny one regression ranges from 1,466 -to 1,502, 





cross-sectional regressions (one for each of the 30 
ln(Relative spreadi,) 
= oc, + Blr ln(Volumejtj + flzt ln(Number of market makersji) 
+ /3ar In(PriCei,) -t fldl ln(VOlatilityjJ 
+ Psi ln(Stabilization proxyi,). 
Each cross-sectionai regression uses da .a from each firm j. 
Our regression results are essentially unchanged if we expand the window to 
60 or 100 days or use a linear specification. We do not repart the results from the 
linear specification since the residuals conform less with the as%umptions of QLS 
analysis. Since we use a log-log specification with price as an independent 
variable, the results are statistically identical whether absolute or relative 
spreads are the dependent variable. 
The mean absolute return is 9.61 O/o on event day 1, 1.69% on event day 10, 
and 1.46% on event day 40. We therefore estimate a volatility measure that 
accounts for event-time-related heteroskedasticity. Our measure of volatility is 
computed as follows: 
VOlatilityi, 
Standard deviation of returns on days 1 - 11 if td6, 
t - 5 to t + 5 if t > 6. 
This measure is a cons?jnt for the first six days arid a two-sided rolling estimate 
of the standard deviation oi returns from day 7 onwards. We also estimate 
volatility using the first 60 retur’;as as well as returns from 61 through 120 days 
after the offer. If stabilization truncates the distribution and biases observed 
volatility downwards [Ruud (1992)], then calculating standard deviations using 
the latter measure should mitigate this bias. Regression resuits using these 
measures of variance remain essentially unchanged. 
We estimate two proxies for the effect of stabilization on the bid-ask spread. 
The first proxy is the ‘nearness’ of the market price to the floor price, calculated 
as ln(Closing bid price/Floor price). We initially assume that the floor price is 
the offer price, which is consistent with the maximum allowable stabilizing bid 
under Rule !@b-7. 
Second, since the effect of stabilization can be modeled as a put option, we 
also estimate Black-Scholes European put option values as an alternative to the 
ratio of the bid price to the floor price. To use the Black-Scholes option pricing 
formula, it is necessary to specify the value of two parameters: T, the number of 
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time periods until the option expires, and b2, the price volatility per period. 
Since our sample contains only NASDAQ firms, the closing quotes used here 
represent firm commitments to buy or sell with nc possibility of rebalancing an 
inventory position until markets reopen the next trading day. The appropriate 
variance is thus the close-to-open variance, which is not available on the CRSP 
NASDAQ tapes. Consequently, we use the standard daily variance estimate. We 
report results using T = I, although our conclusions are unaffected by the 
choice of 7’. We alsa assu:ne that the overnight risk-free rate is zero. 
Put = Floor * W( - 421) - price * Y( - 
where 
w-1 = Cumulative normal operator, 
** .- # ,i _ = [in(Bid price/Floor price) -I- &21/a, 
422 =d&-(i, 
Floor = Offer price. 
5. The effect of stabilizatiori m bid-ask spreads 
5.1. Relation of In(Bid price/Offer price) to bid-ask spreads 
The first measure of potential stabilization is the log of the r&io of the closing 
bid price to the offer price, or the ‘nearness’ of the market price to the floor price. 
When this measure is large and positive, the current market price is above the 
hypothesized floor and the associated reduction in inventory losses attributable 
to the existence of stabilization is small. As this ratio approaches zero or turns 
negative, however, the floor price becomes a more relevant boundary and 
spreads ~1: uld narrow. 
Consequently, we examine the behavior of &, the estimate of the effect of 
ln(Bid price/Offer price) on quoted spreads. If price stabilization exists and 
aflects the bid-ask spread, then we expect that & should be positiue and that 
any significance of the relation should diminish over time. 
Estimates of & for each day over the first thirty days of trading are plotted in 
fig. 1, with estimates significant at the 1% and 5% level highlighted. Consistent 
with our hypotheses, estimates of flsr arc positive and significantly related to 
bid-ask spreads for tire first ten days of trilding after suntrolling for volume, the 
number of market makers, the midpoint of the bid and. ask priG?s, and volatility. 
The observed pattern in the stabilization coeifficient estimai-es is not due to 
shifts in the correlatSon structure of the independent variables over event time. 
Table 1 presents the regresG;l t-es&s for each of the first ten trading days and 
in five-trading-day mtervlals thereafter. Only the volume coe&ient changes in 
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0.80 
Event Day 
blk. 1. -~‘Iqk fi,gpare pi 4s estimates of fist, the coefficient linking the width of the bid-ask spread to 
In(IM price/Q!% c:rti+ 3. he coefficient is estimatsd %z croWsectional regressions of thz rMrn 
rue 9Y ;+e *nread\ . or1 + fit? In(Voiume) + St8 ln(Number of market makers) + 63, d(Piice) + 
&, &Voiztiliiy) -r i! _,t . ?’ ; IU , do nr :ce/Offer pricP 5~ J, = 1 to 30. Tire volatility me=ure i§ the rolling 
standard dev -p*io , k-**~.qited as rire standard deviation of daily ret,rrns of the E_tst eleven days if the 
event day is ~G;S ;ran CI~ eq~; :’ :‘.c, 5where everit day = 1 is the o& : ?+:.:t .3f he IBO. If &G ,vsnt day is 
greater than 6, then vola4hty ts measured ,.5 tne standard d&at&i of daily returns over the 
eleven-day window from five days before to five days after the event day. The sample consists of 
1,523 IPOs on NASDAQ between 1982 and 1987, identified from Investwent Dealers’ Digest. The 
number of observations for each event day cross-sectional regression varies from 1,466 to 1,502. All 
data, wit’ii the exception of the offer price, are from the CRSP NASDAQ tapes. 
event time, although the change in that coefficient is only weakly correlated with 
changes in &. 
Since we use a log-log specification, coefficient estimates are unit-free and can 
be interpreted as elasticities. Consequently, the magnitudes of the coefficients 
are related to the relative economic importance of the independent variables. 
Table 1 demonstrates that the largest elasticity over the first few days is 
associated with the stabilization variable. 
These results are uniformly consistent with the nropositions that the relation 
between the width of the ;Gd-ask spread and the d$tance between posted quotes 
and the floor price is significantly positive and that this relation decays by 
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5.2. Relation of Black-&holes put options to bid-ask spreads 
Our second testable hypothesis states that the effect of a stabilizing bid on 
dealers’ losses can be modeled as a put option. In other words, the presence of 
price stabilization electively truncates dealers’ potential downside losses from 
adverse price movements. For each firm on each event date, put option values 
are calculated as described above and then used as proxies for stabilization in 
the cross-sectional regressions. Since these put options are ‘written’ by the 
stabilizer and held by the remaining dealers, spreads should narrow as the 
option value increases. Consequently, if price stabilization exists and affects the 
bid-ask spread, we predict that fljt should be negative immediately after the offer 
and should diminish in event time. 
Estimates from this specification are plotted in fig. 2. Estimates of Bsr are 
negative and significant over the first ten days for all days except day 7. 
Therefore, spreads are significantly related to the value of the put option written 
by the stabilizer, conditional on volume, the number of market makers, the price 
level, and variance. 
The (log) difference between the market price and the floor price ts an 
important component i.n the option value, and our two proxies for the value of 
stabilization are highly correlated (R2 = 0.546 across all 45,237 observations). 
Therefore, tests using estimated put option values cannot be considered to be 
independent of those using ln(Bid price/Offer price). 
The results presented in table 1 and figs. 1 and 2 are consistent with the 
presence of stabilizing bids during the first ten days trading. Of course, stabiliz- 
ing activities are costly to the underwriter: prolonged stabilization is capital- 
intensive and in possible violaticn of the anti-manipulation provisions of 
the Securities Exchange Act. Therefore, we attribute the decay in the co- 
efficients during this period to the suspension or abandonment of stabilization 
programs. 
5.3. Tests of robustraess 
We first examine the robustness of our results using alternative specifications 
for the floor price. Initially, we assume that stabilization occurs at the offer price. 
However, constraining the floor price to be equal to the offer price maximizes 
the truncation of the price distribution. It is possible that if an issue is faring 
poorly, the underwriter will reduce the floor below the offer price. Ruud (1992) 
refers to this phenomena as ‘partial price support’. Therefore, we estimate an 
alternative specification in which the support price equals the minimum of the 
offer price and the previous day’s closing pri~c;. YVe use the previous day’s 
closing price as an estimate of the floor price because of the regulatory con- 
straint that the stabilizing bid cannot exceed the highest independent dealer’s 
bid. The results are not significantly different from those reported above. 
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Fig. 2. This figure plots estimates of fist, the coefficient linking the width of the bid-ask spread to the 
Black-Scholes option value of a European Put Option with S = Stock price, X = Offer price, 
if= l,rr= 0, and cr = Volatility. The volatility measure is the rolling standard deviation computed 
as the standard deviation of daily returns of the first eleven days if the event day is less than or equal 
to 6 where event day = 1 is the offer date of the IPO. If the event day is greater than 6, then volatility 
is measured as the standard deviation of daily returns over the eleven-day window from five days 
before to five days after the event day. The coefficient is estimated from cross-sectional regressions 
of the form ln(Relative spread) = a, + j&t ln(Volume) + &,ln(Number of market makers) + 
fls, ln(Price) + /I4, ln(Volatility) + fisr ln(Put value) for t = 1 to 30. The sample consists of i ,523 IPOs 
on NASDAQ between 1982 and 1987, identified from Inoestwnt Dealers’ Digest. The number of 
observations for each event day cross-sectional regression varies from 1,466 to 1,502. All data, with . 
the exception of the offer price, are from the CRSP NASDAQ tapes. 
In addition, we examine two alternative interpretations for our findings. First, 
the CRSP tapes may record a market-determined ask price and a fixed stabi- 
lizer’s bid. If the bid price is fixed and only the ask price varies, bid-ask spreads 
and midpoints are perfectly correlated. To rule out this mechanical alternative, 
we estimate the regressions using only those observations for which the best 
bid exceeds the offer price. Since stabilization is prohibited by law at values 
above the offer price, this subset should not contain stabilizing bids. The results 
for this subsample are not qualitatively different from the results for the full 
sample. 
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The second interpretation is provided by Rock’s (1986) model of adverse 
selection in IPOs. In this model, the proportion of informed traders in under- 
priced issues is greater than the proportion for overpriced issues. Thus, dealers 
in underpriced issues face a higher probability of trading against informed 
investors. Those dealers widen their quotes, generating a relation between ln(Bid 
price/Offer price) and the width of the bid-ask spread. 
There is little evidence, however, of positive abnormal returns beyond the 
initial trading day. Barry and Jennings (1992) demonstrate that underpricing is 
typically resolved at the first trade. Miller and Reilly (1987) provide evidence 
that any effects of Rock’s adverse selection on bid-ask spreads are relevant only 
on the initial trading day. Therefore, the adverse information hypothesis should 
not affect our results beyond the first trading day. 
6. The efkct of stabilization on reported returns 
We examine returns following the hypothesized end of stabilization to deter- 
mine whether the removal of stabilization leads to immediate price declines. We 
do so for two reasons. First, return-based evidence consistent with stabilization 
complements the spread results and increases the likelihood that the spread 
results +:ti attributable to stabilization. Second, though numerous studies exam- 
ine returns for various IPO-based investment strategies, few (to our knowledge) 
explicitly recognize the potential impact of stabilization. It is therefore impor- 
tar.: to document situations in which returns may be materially affected by 
stabilizing activities. 
Since we cannot determine the actual date that stabilization ceases for each 
offer, we perform two tests based on different assumptions about when stabili- 
zation ends. Our tests employing bid-ask spreads indicate that stabilization has 
a significant effect on quoted spreads for roughly the first ten trading days; few 
coefhcients associated with event days beyond that period are significant. In the 
first test we focus on returns immediately following day IO. If stabilization is 
successful in maintaining prices above their intrinsic value, then price declines 
should, on average, occur at the end of stabilization, and such declines should 
occur only for those firms most likely LO have experienced stabilization. 
To capture diflerences in potential stabilization, we partition the sample into 
four groups, based upon the relation of the offer price to the day 10 market price: 
Group 1: Issues with market prices more than 3% below the offer price (370 
issues). 
Grozdp 2: Issues for which the market price is equal to or no more than 3% 
below the offer price ( 18 1 issues). 
Group 3: Issues for which the market price exceeds the offer price by no more 
than 3% (169 issues). 
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Gray 4: Issues for which the market price exceeds the offer price by more than 
3 % (803 issues). 
We choose the 3% boundary since it represents a typical bid-ask spread 
width for our sample. Movements beyond 3% cannot be interpreted as move- 
ments from the bid to the ask or vice versa but must be due to changes in the 
posted quote. 
Issues that have market prices less than or equal to the offer price on day 10 
are partitioned into groups 1 and 2. Since stabilization is a capital-intensive 
process, we hypothesize that issues which experience declines in value either will 
be too costly to stabilize for a long period of time or will not be stabilized at all. 
Therefore, issues in group 1 may contain some firms that were stabilized and 
others for which stabilization was either not attempted or proved unsustainable 
and was abandoned. Group 2, on the other hand, is comprised of those issues 
most likely to be stabilized since price declines are relatively small. In both 
groups, we expect that at least a portion of the issues will have been stabilized. 
Consequently, we anticipate subsequent price declines. 
Since an underwriter is prohibited from stabilizing at a price above the offer 
price, stabilization is not a factor in groups 3 and 4 as of the tenth day. 
Therefore, we do not expect any significant price changes after the tenth day of 
trading when stabilization hypothetically ends. We include these issues as a way 
of contrasting return behavior after day 10 for stabilized and nonstabilized 
issues. 
We measure the significance of returns after day 10 for these groups in 
a regression framework that accommodates potential cross-sectional return 
heteroskedasticity. The cumulative returns from the midpoint close of day 10 to 
the midpoint close of days 11 through 15, and from the midpoint close of day 10 
to the midpoint close of days 20,25, and 30, are regressed against four indicator 
variables, one for each group. There is no intercept in the model, so the 
coefficient of the ith indicator variable is interpreted as the mean return for 
group i. White (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent estimates of standard errors are 
calculated. 
The results, presented in table 2, are consistent with the hypothesis that 
stabilization maintains prices above their equilibrium value. In the five days 
following.day 10, the accumulated returns for groups 1 and 2 (those hypoth- 
esized most likely to be affected by stabilization) are - 1.39% and - 2.08%, 
with associated White (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics of - 2.87 
and - 4.22. Finding negative returns for group 2 that are larger (in absolute 
value) than those in group 1 is consistent with the 1940 SE@ release, which 
recognizes that 
stabilization is regarded as necessary only in the case of issues which are 
neither notable successes nor notable failures . . . . In the latter, where the 
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Table 2 
Cumulative average returns, from day - 10 to day 30, for four groups of IPOs. Group 1 consists of 
370 issues that have a day - 10 market price is lower than the offer price by at least 3%. Group 
2 consists of 181 issues that have a day - 10 market price that is equal to or no more than 3% below 
the offer price. Group 3 consists of 169 issues that have a day - 10 market price that is greater than 
the offer price by no more than 3%. Group 4 consists of 803 issues that have a day - 10 market 
pri;c that is greater than the offer price by more than 3%. The sample consists of 1,523 IPOs issued 
on NASDAQ between 1982 and 1987, identified from Inoestment Dealers’ Digest. All data, with the 
exception of the offer price, are from the CRSP NA!;DAQ tapes. White (1980) heteroskedastic- 
consistent r-statistics are in parentheses. 
--_._- 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Window Pro c 0.97 * Offer price Offer price 1.03 * Offer price 
0.97 * Offer price d PI0 < < Pro < < PI0 










( - 3.68) 
- 0.99% 
( - 3.60) 
- 1.05% 
( - 2.77) 
- 1.23% 
( - 2.75) 
- 1.39% 
( - 2.87) 
- 1.50% 
( - 2.35) 
I .48 O/o 
( 12.00) 
- 1.85% 
i - 2.19) 
- 0.57% 
( - 3.76) 
- 0.95% 
( - 4.01) 
- 1.04% 
( - 2.66) 
- 1.55% 
: - 2.76) 
- 2.08% 
( - 4.22) 
- 3.05% 
( - 4.02) 
- 3.22% 
( - 3.68) 
- 3.11% 






( - 0.46) 
- 0.24% 
( - 0.57) 
- 0.54% 
( .- 1.20) 
- 0.49% 
( - 0.62) 
- 0.20% 



















selling pressure in the open market is too great, the underwriters cannot 
afford to support the market at or near the issues’.original offering price. 
For the same reason, stabilizing cannot as a practical matter be used to 
stem a market or economic trend of any real significance [Securities 
Exchange Act Release 2446 (1940)]. 
In contrast, groups 3 and 4, which are expected to be unaffected by stabili- 
zation, $&o-w no significant return behavior over the same interval. Accumulated 
returns i’n the five days following day 10 are - 0.54% for group 3 and 0.45% for 
group 4, with associated White (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics of 
- 1.20 and 1.63, respectively? The conclusions are similar when net-of-market 
‘In a related test Miller and Reilly (1987) document that issues that are overpriced on day P have 
significant ;negativd returns twenty-one days after the offer. However, they provide no explanation 
for their findings. 
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returns are used or contemporaneous market returns are included in the 
regression. 
In the second test, we relax the assumption that stabilization ends on day 10 
and allow stabilization to end at any time during the first fifteen days of trading. 
However, we assume that stabilization only occurs at the offer price. Therefore, 
observing a closing bid price below the offer price is interpreted as evidence that 
stabilization activities are terminated. We divide the total sample into two 
groups, Sample and Control. For the 772 ‘stabilized’ issues (Sample), we define 
day 7 as the first day that we observe a closing bid below the offer price. Next, we 
calculate cume&~tive five-day returns from the closing bid on day 7 to the closing 
bid on day r + 5. Fkjr the 751 firms with no closing bids below the offer price 
during the tirst 15 dlrys (Control), 7 is randomly assigned from a distribution 
over days J-15 that mimics the empirical distribution of 7 for the 772 Sample 
firms, and five-day bid-to-bid returns are calculated. 
To examine differs ces between firms that are classified as stabilized [at least 
one bid price less than the offer price (Sample)] and those that are not stabilized 
[bid prices never !!ess than the offer price (Control)], we estimate a regression 
equation with the five-day (7 to 7 + 5) cumulative bid-to-bid returns as the 
dependent variable and a iiummy variable equal to 0%~ rbr firms that are 
stabilized and zero for issues that are not. The intercept of this regression, which 
can be interpreted as tite mean return for the control sample, is C 76% [White 
(1980) heteroskedastic-consistent :-statistic = 2.501. The coeffic~~~e b assrciated 
with the indicator variable, which ‘s interpreted as the mear difference in 
cumulative returns between the two groups, is - 2.47% [White (1980) hetero- 
skedastic-consistent t-statistic = - 5.691. In other words, issues that are hy- 
pothesized to have been stabilized have significant negative returns in the five 
days after stabilizing activities are posited to have ended. 
These results are equivalent for the Sample and Control groups when using (i) 
different accumulation windows, (ii) a sample in which we delete all firm for 
which 7 is equal to the first trading day (to differentiate the effect of stabilization 
from that documented by Miller and Reilly), (iii) net-of-market returns, (iv) the 
corresponding cumulative market return in the regression, (v) osly those Con- 
trol firms that experienced a price decline on day a, and (vi) combinations of 
these robustness tests. 
Conditional upon observing whether the closing price is below the offer price, 
there is a predictable component in subsequent five-day returns. Regardless of 
the duration of stabilization or the level at which the underwriter stabilizes, we 
have indirect evidence that the withdrawal of stabilization significantly affects 
subsequent prices. These results are consistent jwith the findings of Ruud (1992), 
who demonstrates that asymmetries in the distribution of cumulative post- 
sf&rina returns diminish in time. 
TheYsignificance of the results of these two tests is surprising. We cannot 
observe which issues are stabilized or when stabilization on a particular issue is 
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suspended. Consequently, our tests, which are predicated either on all stabili- 
zation endin 4 on day 10 (as assumed in the first test) or on stabilization never 
occurring below the offer price (as assumed in the second test), are diminished in 
power. Nonetheless, we find a significant decline in the value of issues most 
hve been stabii&:, regardless of our assumptions about the timing 
and duration of stabilization. 
Although significant declines in value occur for issues that are hypothesized to 
be stabilized, it is unlikely that an investor will be able to profitably exploit this 
knowlledae. Short selling is generally not feasible while the distribution of the 
offeril ‘,’ 5 oi>e n, and it is unlikely that syndicate members wouiJ allow short 
positions during the first few days of trading. 
We inda2:ctl.y examine the effects of price stabilization on the market for new 
issues of common stock. For a sample of 1,523 NASDAQ initial public offerings 
issued between 1952 and 1987, we find evidence which suggests that stabilization 
significantly affects quoted spreads. Quoted spreads are narrower when stabiii- 
zation is expected to be most important, i.e., when transactions prices are close 
to the offer price during the first ten to fifteen trading days. We also provide 
evidence that stabilization has a tangible impact on prices; when stabilization is 
assumed to be suspended, market prices decline by approximately 2.5% over the 
following five days. 
These results are important for three reasons. First, this study, along with 
Ruud (1992), demonstrates that stabilization has a significant impact on the 
after-market price of initial public offerings. Previous s*udies of returns to 
investors in IPOs have ignored the effect of stabilization .3n reported returns. 
Second, our results are of interest to those studying market structure as a com- 
petitive market for supplying liquidity services. We find that the value of a put 
?::jtion implicitly written by a stabilizer is valued by dealers, and as a result, 
t>ompetition narrows spreads. 
Finally, establishing that stabilization is common in the after-issue market for 
initial public offerings is important from a public policy perspective. Investors 
who engage in what they believe are open market transactions at prices deter- 
mined by the unencumbered forces of supply and demand may find instead that 
they have purchased shares at artificially inflated prices and subsequently suffer 
losses. Perhaps most surprising of all for investors is that this svstematic and 
deliberate manipulation is completely legal under current securities ‘!a~. 
Appendix 
The value of a stabilizing bid to nonstabilizing dealers can be derived using an 
options pricing framework. Copeland and Galai (1983) argue that for a dealer 
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who sets a bid-ask quote, the exnecled loss per transaction is proportional to 
Bid 
L = Ask) f (S)dS + s id - S)f (S)dS , 0 (1) 
where S is the subsequen,!fy revealed ‘true’ underlying asset value, governed by 
the distrib:%ion j(S), Ask is the quoted ask price, and Bid is the quoted bid price. 
Due to the. short lives of these options, ignoring iscounting does not change the 
analysis. 
In eq. (l), the first part of ihe loss is the opportunity loss of selling too low. In 
other words, the dealer has sold at an ask that is less than the subsequent true 
value. The latter half of the equation models the loss of buying too high. As an 
example of the downs& ;dsk associated with the dealer’s position, co lsider the 
situation in which a dealer buys a share at the prevailing bid and subsequently 
discovers that the true, post-trade price has moved to some S c Bid. The dealer 
loses the difference between the bid price and the post-trade price. The bid and 
ask prices are set such that the expected downside losses due to the price 
declines, or forgone profits due to price increases, are exactly offset, under 
perfect co&+ m-etitfsn, by revenues earned (via the bid-ask spread) when the price 
does not change. 
As a result, the payoffs to the dealer are equivalent to those generated by 
a strategy in which the dealer writes a naked put with a strike price equal to the 
bid and writes a naked call with the strike equal to the ask. The loss per 
transaction, in this case, can be approximated by the value of a short straddle. 
[Copeland and Galai (1983), especially in section 5, provide details and limita- 
tions of the short straddle analogy. Due to the microstructure mechanisms of the 
NASDAQ system, a better analogy is the Copeland and Galai model for open 
quote intervals (section 1I.B). We do not present this model since it is exposition- 
ally more cumbersome, although it yields identical predictions.] 
Assume that a dealer (who is not an underwriter or stabilizer) believes that 
there exists some maintained floor price; that is, there exists some price, F, at 
which a stabilizer is willing to buy some quantity of the stock from dealers. In 
this case, prospective losses to adverse price moves are truncated. Also assume 
that the dealer expects to be able to sell a fraction, Qi, of his inventory to the 
stabilizer in the evcat that the true asset value falls below the floor price. 
Consequently, the expected per-transaction loss in a market in which stabili- 




Ls = (S - Ask)f(S) dS + (1 - @) 
s 





(Bid - S)f (S) dS + @ F(Bid - F)j(S) dS . 
F s 0 
(2) 
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The first ic;egral ir eq. (2) is the same as in eq. (l), since issues that increase in 
value are not aKeoied by stabilization. The remainder of eq. (2) breaks down the 
expected downside losses given that the potential for stabilization exists. The 
second integral is the expected loss for the proportion of shares that will not be 
bought by the stabilizer. In this case, the dealer bears the full weight of a price 
decline but only for a limit& quantity, (1 - @). For the remaining proportion of 
shares, the dealer faces a loss from two sources. If the true value, S, is greater 
than the floor but less than the dealer’s bid, the dealer suffers a loss equal to the 
difference between the bid and S since stabilization does not occur unless S < F. 
This loss is captured by the third integral. If, as shown in the last integral of eq. 
(2), the true value (S) is iess than the Boor price, the dealer limits his loss by 
selling to the stabilizer at a price F. 
Under these scenarios, the change in the cost of providing liquidity services is 
borne by the stabilizer ant? is proportional to 
J 
3s 
AL=L-Ls= @ (S- F)f (S)dS. (3 
0 
In short, the stabilizer has written, and the other dealers have received, 
a fraction of a put option with a strike price equal to the floor. Assuming the 
dealer market is competitive and a zero-profit constraint is imposed, then the 
value of the stabilizer’s put should b2 incorporated into the per-transaction cost 
of providing liquidity, or the bid--ask spread. 
Note that the above analysis is not predicated on observing actual stabilizing 
trades, but merely on the presence of a stabilizer and the belief by dealers that 
a stabi!izer will be willing to absorb some fraction of their inventories at the 
floor price. Further, since the value of eq. (3) must be negative, there is a reduc- 
tion in the expected cost to providing liquidity services even if @ and F are 
unknown to lgonstabilizing dealers. 
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